ABSTRACT: This article examines how U.S. peace movement organizations (PMOs
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States have been popularly hailed as so profound that social and political life in the country will "never be the same again." This shortsighted view of history aside, it remains true that peace movement organizations-like other social organizations and political institutionshave struggled to respond not only to the attacks, but also to a cultural climate and a political landscape that have changed in significant ways. The attacks and the government's responses raised fears and unleashed a powerful but uncritical brand of American patriotism. Bringing to justice those responsible for the 9/11 attacks became widely understood as a just cause. Those opposing war found few political opportunities to influence either domestic or international security policy. This article endeavors to explain why prominent peace movement organizations adopted certain framing strategies in response to interrelated cultural and political processes after 9/11 that discouraged mass dissent.
Few scholars have examined the obstacles to discursive efforts by activists to increase movement participation in contexts in which a state and its policies possess high levels of legitimacy. To fill this gap, we developed an analytical framework anchored by Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony. We theorize that PMOs can respond discursively to hegemony by either challenging it, harnessing it, or a combination of both. We further argue that whereas strengthened hegemony and legitimated political closure encourage framing that harnesses hegemony, oppositional identities encourage framing that challenges hegemony. A combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses of official statements issued by nine prominent peace movement organizations in the U.S. after 9/11 illustrates the utility of our conceptual framework. Heightened nationalism created discursive and emotional opportunities for PMOs to harness hegemony by drawing upon widely circulating and highly authoritative ideas, by conforming to emotional norms, and by linking strong emotions to opposing war and repression. Legitimated political closure also encouraged PMOs to harness hegemony by arguing that the prevailing consensus for war and repression constituted grave threats to civil liberties and democracy. At the same time, oppositional identities rooted in awareness of structural inequalities encouraged PMOs to challenge hegemony by highlighting the costs of war and repression to minority groups. Our findings offer important new insights regarding the impact of interrelated macrolevel cultural, emotional, and political processes upon collective action framing as mediated by organizational identity.
HEGEMONY
Political process theorists have emphasized inclusion and exclusion as tools for limiting mass dissent available to the state (e.g., Koopmans 1993; Kriesi et al. 1995) . A more symbolically oriented but equally important tool of social control has received less attention-persuasion. When many are persuaded that they either have no "real" grievances or that power holders are successfully addressing their concerns, efforts to mobilize mass dissent are unlikely to succeed. The concept of hegemony highlights persuasion as a form of social control. Hegemony entails cultural processes that contribute to the legitimacy of power holders and their policies (Anderson 1977; Gramsci 1971; Williams 1982) . Political elites strive for legitimacypopular consent to their rule as reasonable, just, and in the interest of society (Barker 1990; Mann 1986) . When governments and their policies are regarded as legitimate, extrainstitutional challenges are perceived as superfluous or counterproductive.
Using terms such as "cultural tool kit" (Swidler 1986) , "cultural resonances" (Gamson 1992; Rohlinger 2002; Ryan 1991) , "cultural reservoir" (Tarrow 1992) , and "shopping cart" (Nagel 1994) , theorists have noted enduring norms, beliefs, language, visual images, narrations, and collective identities circulating widely among the general public. Within this vast symbolic stock, ideas exist that, because of their frequent invocation by those with disproportionate access to and influence over the primary means of mass communication, carry an authority extending beyond the individuals referencing them (Ferree 2003; Steinberg 1999) . Like Williams (2002) , we refer to these familiar and authoritative ideas as the dominant symbolic repertoire. 1 In this article, we focus on two cultural processes that legitimated war and repression as responses to the events of 9/11: (1) long-term exposure of citizens to the dominant symbolic repertoire, contributing to interpretive and emotional predispositions among policy makers and the public to support war and repression; and (2) framing practices that take advantage of discursive and emotional opportunities associated with these predispositions to heighten the resonance and potency of calls for war and repression. Through socialization, members of a society become predisposed toward using ideas in the dominant symbolic repertoire to both interpret and respond to collective public events. The diagnostic lenses and prognostic scripts typically fashioned from these institutionally privileged ideas legitimate warfare and repression as responses to political violence by an out-group. For example, because the state is expected to defend the nation from danger, citizens have a duty to honor the state's call to take up arms and to sacrifice civil liberties for the sake of national security. To challenge the state under siege is to abandon the nation during its time of greatest need and to expose the nation to danger. By providing intuitive receptivity toward framing that draws on it, the dominant symbolic repertoire presents not only discursive opportunities to mobilize mass consent to war and repression, but also to limit mass dissent against these responses to social conflict (Ferree 2003) . Gallup polls taken in the hours immediately following the morning of 9/11 show that the majority of Americans saw the attacks as an "act of war" and supported a military response (Moore 2001; Saad 2001) . The state also profited from an immediate and significant boost in its legitimacy. National Opinion Research Center surveys indicate that great confidence in the executive branch had fallen to 13.5 percent of respondents in the early stages of the Bush administration (Smith, Rasinski, and Toce 2001:3) . After 9/11, however, confidence in the executive branch soared to 51.5 percent of respondents.
Collective public events also affect the emotional climate in a society. Emotions mediate between the individual and the social world (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000) , and thus they play a significant part in defining a cultural context in which contention takes place (Jasper and Polletta 2001) . The events of 9/11 provided emotional opportunities to generate support for war and repression. We define emotional opportunities as those time periods or moments when the public expression of particularly potent emotions is widely regarded as socially or politically appropriate. Political elites translate anger, fear, and national pride into obligations for citizens to support war and repression (Aminzade and McAdam 2001) . Framing that both specifically references widely and deeply felt emotions and links these emotions with attributions will likely strike a responsive chord in potential supporters. Emotions also surged after 9/11 in ways that strengthened nationalist identity. According to the findings of a national survey conducted between September 13 and September 27, 2001, by the National Opinion Research Center, 97 percent of respondents agreed they "would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world" (Smith, Rasinski, and Toce 2001:2) . This constituted a 7 percent increase over the agreement rate in the 1996 General Social Survey.
Although an emotional response to collective public events may be widely and deeply felt, its public expression is not always viewed as appropriate (Gould 2004; Whittier 2001) . To be persuasive, therefore, framing must amplify strong emotions whose public expressions are widely permitted. In instances of transnational conflict, the norms are to express pride in one's nation and to display feelings of hostility toward those constructed as the enemy of the nation and the state that protects it. By permitting the public expression of strong feelings experienced in response to an attack by an out-group, these norms grant policy makers emotional opportunities to mobilize mass consent to war and repression as responses to social conflict.
Discursive and emotional opportunities, however, do not guarantee lasting, widespread support for specific policies (Coles 1998) . The strength of hegemony depended, in part, on the ability of the Bush administration to translate these opportunities into active, sustained support for war and repression as responses to the collective public events of 9/11. In a televised speech to Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush stated: "Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done." Framing that resonated with the dominant symbolic repertoire, that conformed to emotional norms, and that tapped into strong emotions contributed to the administration's sustaining high approval ratings for a duration only rivaled by approval for the Johnson administration in 1964 (Jones 2001) . Strengthened hegemony after 9/11 provided the Bush administration with a decided advantage over the peace movement, because the public was discursively and emotionally primed to support war and repression. We now discuss the framing strategies available to the U.S. peace movement in its uphill climb to capture hearts and minds.
U.S. PEACE MOVEMENT RESPONSES
A large body of research has established the influence of political actors upon one another's framing practices (e.g., Coles 1998; Esacove 2004; Haydu 1999; Ku 2001; McCaffrey and Keys 2000; McCright and Dunlap 2000) . Activists discuss framing in reference to adhering to principled and affiliated group commitments, increasing participation, persuading policy makers, dissuading potential opponents from mobilizing against them, and countering the frames used by opponents. Peace activists have three framing options available in responding to strengthened hegemony. They can construct frames that challenge hegemony or attempt to harness hegemony, or construct hybrid frames that mix both these practices.
Challenging Hegemony
Challenging hegemony involves framing that both draws on and creates oppositional knowledge contradicting the dominant symbolic repertoire (Carroll and Ratner 2001; Gamson 1992; Mansbridge 2001; Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett 2002; Roszak 1968; Williams 1977) . Whereas power holders tap into interpretive predispositions, those who challenge hegemony try to limit the resonance of pro-war frames by undermining the dominant symbolic repertoire. Challengers also seek to weaken emotional norms by decoupling positive relationships between the dominant repertoire and the strong emotions of potential constituents. Antiwar framing that challenges hegemony counters not only specific pro-war framing, but also broader ideas from the dominant symbolic repertoire that give pro-war framing its potency. Taken-for-granted beliefs are rejected and deference to the state is questioned. For example, some of the organizations in our study chose not to emphasize the image of the United States as a victim of an unprovoked attack. Instead, they presented the picture of the United States as an aggressive imperial power and as a catalyst in perpetuating the cycle of violence. Additionally, those who challenge hegemony will often draw on oppositional knowledge to enhance the appeal of frames among those belonging to social networks typically mobilized by the movement (e.g., Carroll and Ratner 2001; Coy and Woehrle 1996; Mansbridge 2001; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Meyer and Whittier 1994) .
Harnessing Hegemony
Rather than challenging hegemony, peace activists can instead appropriate ideas from the dominant symbolic repertoire to support oppositional claims, thus harnessing hegemony. 2 Political violence by an out-group also affects the emotional climate, generating negative emotions against the perceived attackers and positive emotions for the victims. Framing that harnesses hegemony takes advantage of the discursive and emotional opportunities that arise from related changes in the cultural and political context. As a discursive strategy, it constitutes a type of "ideational jiu-jitsu," whereby rather than trying to block the resonance of ideas from the dominant symbolic repertoire, activists embrace the weight of these resonances and go on the discursive offensive. 3 Antiwar framing that harnesses hegemony mirrors pro-war framing-the symbolic contents are the same-but the diagnostic and prognostic attributions are reversed. For example, "peace is patriotic" or "support the troops: bring them home now" enlist widely and deeply resonant ideas on behalf of opposing war. In the process, the dominant symbolic repertoire becomes contested discursive terrain that both sides seek to define and control. 4 Although harnessing hegemony appears to be practical and effective, we also observe that it poses both strategic and affective dilemmas for peace activists.
Hybrid Responses
The heuristic distinction between challenging and harnessing highlights discursive dilemmas that strengthened hegemony poses for peace activists. By attaching different meanings to the same dominant symbolic repertoire that supporters of war regularly reference, harnessing hegemony risks confusing and demobilizing potential constituents who may become unsure of whom to believe Rohlinger 2002) . Moreover, harnessing hegemony may inadvertently fuel hegemony by increasing the potency of ideas inextricably linked in the popular psyche with existing social relations (Ku 2001; Ryan 1991) .
Another concern is that activists appropriating ideas from the dominant symbolic repertoire might find their demands diluted to the point that "winning" changes very little. In addition, activists who harness hegemony are vulnerable to allegations of co-optation (e.g., Benford 1993; Coles 1999; Tarrow 1992) . Favorably referencing the dominant symbolic repertoire can easily upset traditional movement constituencies who assume that these ideas are rigidly connected to power structures such that their use perpetuates undesirable mentalities and social practices. Those belonging to minority groups may especially perceive attempts to harness hegemonic and stereotypical representations of their groups as perpetuating their oppression.
On the other hand, challenging ideas from the dominant symbolic repertoire can invite incomprehension, ridicule, dismissal, and active opposition from policy makers and the general public. Statements that criticize hegemonic images of being "American" are unlikely to gain new participants for the movement. Few of us like to be told that we are gluttonous, aggressive, bigoted, and oppressive. Even if oppositional knowledge is widely embraced, power holders can co-opt and rework it to legitimate their policies (e.g., Coy and Hedeen 2005; Naples 2002: 243-44) ; in effect, harnessing oppositional knowledge.
The flexible and self-contradictory nature of symbolic codes, the multifaceted and fragmented character of social identities, the dilemmas posed by a strengthened hegemony, and the existence of multiple audiences all suggest to us that it is more fruitful to view harnessing hegemony and challenging hegemony as part of a discursive continuum rather than as dichotomies. Both intentionally and unintentionally, for both affective and strategic reasons, activists will fashion variegated messages. These messages resonate somewhat with the dominant symbolic repertoire while also partially resonating with oppositional knowledge. While acknowledging the likelihood of activists engaging in mixed responses to hegemony, we also theorize that certain factors orient activists toward either challenging hegemony or harnessing it. We now describe the methods by which we both tested our ideas and drew our conclusions regarding factors affecting framing practices by the U.S. peace movement in response to strengthened hegemony after 9/11.
METHODOLOGY
The data set includes a total of fifty-six official statements issued by nine nationally recognized U.S. peace movement organizations between September 11, 2001, and March 31, 2002, in Five of these groups (AFSC, FOR, PaxC, PA, and WILPF) were chosen to create a longitudinal data set when combined with a previous study regarding the Persian Gulf War in 1990 to 1991 (Coy and Woehrle 1996) . Four more were added (BRC, NYCLAW, WAND, and WRL) to increase the diversity of the sample in terms of religious versus secular belief systems as well as to represent groups with organizational identities centered upon prominent social cleavages (e.g., race, class, and gender).
We defined "official statements" as press and media releases, printed statements, editorials, and public calls to action from an organization's national office, issued in the name of the organization as a whole. They are statements released to the mainstream media and/or posted to the organization's Web site as news releases. Because they represent the public face and voice of a social movement organization, official statements arguably provide the best record of an organization's evolving official positions and participation in public discourse.
Once the data were collected, we generated a preliminary list of codes by adapting the coding list from the previous study (Coy and Woehrle 1996) . Additional codes were defined inductively from the data and deductively from our research hypotheses. Our codes covered a range of themes of interest to the PMOs. When taken together, the codes provide a systematic and rigorous way to ascertain both the diversity and prevalence of framing practices within the data set. To facilitate coding and analysis we used NVivo-a qualitative analysis software program.
Increasing coding reliability required developing a common understanding of the coding structure. To assist in this understanding, we went through a two-stage pilot coding process using a sample of paragraphs from across the range of documents. Based on the pilot coding, we further refined the code list and definitions and came to consensus on thirty-six codes and a corresponding set of coding rules and principles. Next we broke the entire data set into segments. Each author served as a primary coder for one data segment, and as a secondary coder for two other segments. The secondary coder went over each code designation, accepting, querying, or challenging it. When the primary and secondary coders came to consensus, the coding was completed.
For statistical analysis the NVivo code frequency reports were exported into Stata. The resulting frequency tabulations were used to highlight areas of interest and to check assumptions about the data. Because we felt it important to include a diverse set of PMOs, we did not eliminate groups just because the number of their official statements was small. The size differential meant, however, that for many queries we could not simply compare the raw number of coding instances. To adjust for this, weights were calculated and the weighted numbers were used as the basis for comparison. From the descriptive statistical analysis, we were led back into the textual data, where we located examples of the patterns and outcomes using the coding categories developed through NVivo. Thus we combined inductive with deductive approaches as well as qualitative with quantitative methods. We now turn to our analysis of the data, discussing factors shaping the ways that U.S. PMOs chose to respond to strengthened hegemony after 9/11.
FACTORS SHAPING RESPONSES TO HEGEMONY
Our analysis reveals that U.S. PMOs responded to both heightened nationalism and legitimated political closure by harnessing hegemony in their framing. However, organizations with oppositional identities rooted in awareness of structural inequalities were more likely to challenge hegemony, emphasizing the costs of war and repression to minority groups. Consistent with these countervailing factors and the strategic dilemmas posed by strengthened hegemony, no group relied exclusively on one framing strategy. Instead, framing often presented a mixture of both harnessing and challenging elements.
The Cultural Context: National Identity and Emotional Resonance
Polletta has persuasively argued for an understanding of culture as the "symbolic dimension of all structures, institutions, and practices. . . . Culture is thus patterned and patterning; it is enabling as well as constraining; and it is observable in linguistic practices, institutional rules, and social rituals" (2004:100). We would add that the potency of the dominant symbolic repertoire is affected by emotion-expression. But given Poletta's (2004) points, emotions also need to be understood within specific structural and cultural realities that shape them (Kemper 2001; Whittier 2001 ). As discussed above, within the dominant symbolic repertoire, activists encounter norms for the expressions of emotions; norms that may differ from movement norms. Both abiding by these norms and connecting strong emotions with their attributions assist social movement organizations in being heard by bystanders and reference publics (Aminzade and McAdam 2001) .
Harnessing Nationalism
All nine U.S. PMOs in our analysis responded to the changed cultural context and the discursive and emotional opportunities arising from the events of 9/11 by harnessing nationalism. Just as government officials appealed to nationalist identity, conformed to the norm of mourning a loss, and amplified feelings of anger, grief, fear, and pride to mobilize support for war abroad and repression at home, peace groups drew on the same identity, conformed to the same emotional norms, and referenced the same strong emotions in efforts to mobilize support for the nonviolent resolution of conflict and respect for human rights. Signaling support for national affiliation and referring sympathetically to the victims of the 9/11 attacks insulated peace groups from stigmatization. Such framing also short-circuited attempts by power holders to define who "we" are, while it also assisted activists in creating oppositional knowledge.
Shortly after 9/11, President Bush spoke to Congress and tried to assure the country that the United States would rise to the challenge of what he framed as a defining moment: "We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war" (Bush 2001) . The PMOs also referenced many of the same nationalist images used by government officials, but did so with different emphases, purposes, and conclu-sions. A strong theme in the PMO responses was that 9/11 and the national crises it unleashed should be understood as a testing period, a "crucial moment" that created an opportunity for the United States to rely on its "true values." For instance, the Fellowship of Reconciliation wrote, What if the United States were to call on all nations of good will to undertake a bold plan to eradicate poverty and illiteracy in the world? The Marshall Plan in the aftermath of World War II helped a devastated Europe build a hopeful future. This is a precedent that draws upon the best of our humanitarian heritage; the times call for such idealism again. (FOR, 12/20/01) Pax Christi issued statements designed to tap into national pride by repeatedly calling forth from fellow citizens "the best of [the] U.S. tradition" and the "best of who we are." They also invoked deeply cultural and gendered metaphors of the motherland: "Our unspeakable grief and pain has, like a woman in labor, also given birth to a new sense of unity and has given the nation an opportunity to show its true character" (PaxC, 09/26/01).
Not unlike the president, these organizations insisted that the stakes were high, but framed the results of this testing period as extending much beyond the United States. The PMOs used the moment to highlight notions of collective identity, national values, and risks to those values that would lead to policy outcomes different from those proposed by the president. For example, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom stated, "the people of the world are watching" to see how the United States would respond and counseled: "Let us demonstrate that our strength is in our resolve to maintain a democratic and free society and break the cycle of violence and retribution" (WILPF, 09/20/01). By referencing a long-standing and highly resonant nationalist narrative of the United States as a global leader (Gamson 1992) , WILPF enhanced the resonance of its framing.
PMOs most frequently invoked national identity during the bombing of Afghanistan, constructing a notion of being American that used traditionally nationalistic themes in the service of peace, human rights, and military moderation. Although the war in Afghanistan and the hunt for Al Qaeda members had broad popular support and were consistently tied to patriotic themes by the war's proponents, the American Friends Service Committee, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and Pax Christi flatly rejected equating patriotism with support for U.S. policies. Instead, these organizations equated patriotism with dissent, including dissent against a war on terror that, although having a just cause, was nonetheless being waged in an unjust manner. For its part, Pax Christi tried to turn the tables on those who used patriotism to silence policy critics when it claimed that the highest form of patriotism is actually criticism itself:
There will be those who will try to tell us that criticizing our national policies in time of crisis is unpatriotic. But as William Fulbright, the former Senator from Arkansas reminds us, "Criticism is more than right; it is an act of patriotism, a higher form of patriotism, I believe, than the familiar ritual of national adulation. All of us have the responsibility to act upon the higher patriotism which is to love our country less for what it is than for what we would like it to be." (PaxC, 09/25/01) The PMOs we studied argued that in a post-9/11 world where so much is thought to have changed, the meanings of patriotism, allegiance, and national pride have not actually changed. As they put it, citizens who want to be true to fundamental American traditions will continue to speak freely, to associate and assemble freely, to dissent freely, and to protect their privacy.
Our assertion that discursive opportunities shaped PMO responses to strengthened hegemony after 9/11 is further supported when we compare our findings to those from our earlier research (Coy and Woehrle 1996) . We compared the frames used by five PMOs (AFSC, FOR, PaxC, PA, and WILPF) during the Gulf War period (1990-91) with the frames used by these same groups after 9/11 (Table 1) .
For both periods, we coded instances in which PMOs either referred to themselves as being Americans, referenced U.S. political or moral traditions, or discussed what is normatively American. When we controlled for differences in the volume of statements produced during the two conflict periods, we found that PMOs were over two times more likely to reference American identity themes during the immediate post-9/11 period than during the Gulf War period. Even with the small number of PMOs, a standard one-way analysis of variance (not shown here) indicates that PMOs were significantly more likely (at better than the 1 percent level) to use the three codes associated with nationalist framing after 9/ 11. When PMOs did engage issues of American identity during the Gulf War, more often than not it was to critique this identity. We coded ten positive references to being American during the Gulf War; we also coded sixteen negative references. For example, PMOs argued that the American lifestyle fueled a war for oil, and they called into question what they termed a "macho" approach to U.S. foreign policy. PMOs apparently felt freer to directly challenge nationalism before and during the Gulf War than they did in the hyperpatriotic environment and period of expected national mourning following 9/11. 5
Emotional Aspects of Framing
One important question facing social movement scholars is when and why emotions themselves become the object of framing processes (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000) . The September 11 attacks created a new cultural climate for peace movement organizing in part because they activated emotional norms governing mourning while unleashing a torrent of strong emotional responses from citizens, movement activists, and policy makers alike. These norms and strong emotions provided opportunities for PMOs to enhance the potency of their framing. Our analysis finds that PMOs wrote extensively and sympathetically about the victims of the attacks, thereby mirroring the sentiments of the larger public even as they turned these sentiments toward critical perspectives on existing structures and policies. All nine of the PMOs used words laden with emotion to describe their response to the loss of life from the attacks, and all nine issued sharply worded judgments on the attacks, with many "condemning" them. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, strong emotion words were common in the statements: "despicable," "horrific," "traumatic," "horrendous," "indescribable suffering," "terrible," "anger," "shock," "mourning," and the "deepest grief imaginable." The PMOs also commonly asked what these emotions should lead to, what kinds of actions they ought to result in for individual citizens and for the government, as well. Emotions themselves became both the object of framing processes and a means for persuasion. In the following statement, the reader is led from shock, grief, and anger to a critical approach to systemic issues through a series of ever-deepening questions that nonetheless keep the focus on grieving the victims and consoling their families.
Now that the initial shock of the September 11 terrorist attacks have passed, deep grief and profound anger have set in for many of us. Now the critical questions that confront us all are several: How can we best comfort those who mourn? How can we begin to heal some of the wounds to all of our souls as well as our bodies? How can we see that justice is really done? How can we build bridges of understanding and reconciliation among all people so that there is no more harm done and no more hatred sown? How can we begin anew the work of creating a world where there can really be peace, addressing the injustice and despair which are so often the seeds of violence, so there will be no more victims? (AFSC, 09/26/01)
Because emotions shape notions of what is politically possible and even desirable (Gould 2004) , these PMOs also chose to use emotions strategically. The PMOs used emotion words as "carriers" to link movement policy critiques to widely shared public experiences. For example, anger about the attacks was expressed and affirmed but then redirected toward U.S. government policies that were perceived to be contributing causes of the attacks. Empathy for the World Trade Center victims was embraced but also redirected so that it might lead to an unaccustomed "humility" on the part of Americans and to a rare "solidarity" with those who live their entire lives in zones of violence. For example, on the day of the attacks, the Fellowship of Reconciliation's statement included the following opening: "With shocking suddenness we find ourselves in the position of so many in the world who live in fear and senseless violence. We are humbled by our vulnerability. Can we learn from all those who have responded to such tragedies with nonviolence, perseverance and noble purpose . . ." (FOR 9/11/01). The PMOs argued that a lesson of 9/11 is that no one is beyond the reach of retaliatory violence. This lesson, in turn, served as a segue to wide-ranging critiques of U.S. gov-ernment unilateralism, weapons sales, foreign aid, and development policies that were said to be contributing causes to international terrorism.
Like Bush administration officials, PMOs fashioned emotion-laden narratives of 9/11 villains, victims, and heroes to create moral obligations. Unlike framing in support of war and repression, however, the moral obligations flowing from these PMO constructions compelled opposition to war, repression, and scapegoating. For instance, Pax Christi's overt acknowledgment of the emotional dimensions that September 11 had for many Americans was followed by an appropriation of the notion of heroism. Pax Christi recognized that the "unspeakable grief and pain" of September 11 had finally shattered the "illusion of invulnerability" most Americans seemed to enjoy. This Catholic group then coupled its recurring appeal to the "best" in the American character with the heroic self-sacrifices of fire fighters, police officers, nurses, and volunteers in the weeks after September 11. But Pax Christi then went farther still as it linked heroism with all those citizens who "stood in the breach and offered protection for our Arab neighbors" while they were being scapegoated. Thus the group replaces traditional notions of both heroism and nationalism that are centered on the defeat of opponents on the battlefield (Ehrenreich 1997 ) with citizen activist heroes who sacrifice to save and protect lives at the expense of only themselves. These selfless actions in the face of a new set of fears facing the United States become the ascribed model of courage. In fact, Pax Christi names these actions the country's "finest hour," in implicit contradistinction to the war on terror and the repression of civil liberties associated with the USA PATRIOT Act, an analysis of which we turn to next.
The Political Context: Civil Liberties and Democracy as National Values
We conceptualize cultural and political changes as overlapping, mutually constitutive processes. Political closure in the context of strengthened hegemony (what we refer to as legitimated political closure) encourages policy-oriented activists to harness hegemony. Tarrow (1998:78-80) identifies dynamic dimensions of the political opportunity structure that alter the likelihood of protest by affecting expectations for failure or success. Political openings encourage collective action by positively affecting expectations for success. Conversely, political closure discourages collective action by negatively affecting expectations for success. Examples of political closure include decreasing institutional access in a relatively open polity, the stabilization of political alignments, unity among elites, the absence of influential allies, high-intensity repression, and the absence of facilitation. Organizers face an uphill climb when political elites unite around a policy agenda and appear immune to pressure (Meyer 2003:26) . The climb becomes particularly steep when policy makers, the mainstream media, and much of the public view political closure as legitimate. Activists must convince targeted elites, bystanders, and reference publics to break with consensus and assume greater risks, even when such risks are widely regarded as unnecessary, futile, and counterproductive. Challenging hegemony in the context of legitimated political closure invites incomprehension, ridicule, and intensified repression. A more promising framing strategy is to somehow convince potential supporters that rather than protecting deeply held values, beliefs, and identities, the consensus on war and heightened repression present grave threats to cherished ideals. By framing the political context as antithetical to authoritative ideas frequently used by power holders to generate legitimacy, harnessing hegemony uses the salience of the dominant symbolic repertoire in an effort to create space for dissent.
After 9/11, the U.S. peace movement faced a context of legitimated political closure. Within three days of the attacks, political elites set aside their differences to support both military intervention abroad and heightened repression at home. With but one dissenting vote, on September 14 Congress authorized the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force" against anyone connected with the attacks on 9/11. Less than a week later, in a televised speech to a joint session of Congress, President Bush (2001:1) praised Republicans and Democrats alike for singing "God Bless America" on the steps of the capitol along with approving $40 billion to "rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military." The administration soon created the Office of Homeland Security and secured the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, further expanding the intelligence and repressive capacities of the state. 6 Public opinion research reveals strong initial support for both of these policy initiatives (e.g., Davis and Silver 2004) .
U.S. PMOs responded to legitimated political closure by framing war and repression as grave threats to core national values. Regarding civil liberties, the American Friends Service Committee stated,
The loss of life, the sadness and the families destroyed by these horrible acts will be with all of us for many years to come. However . . . our grief is not a cry for war. The very principles on which this country was founded do not support the erosion of civil liberties or the condemnation and discrimination of entire groups of people for individual acts. (AFSC, 10/02/01) Davis and Silver's (2004) national Civil Liberties Survey, conducted in the months immediately following 9/11, found that although Americans were generally willing to trade off civil liberties for greater security, this willingness interacted with the degree of a sense of threat and with the degree of trust in government. Accordingly, PMOs argued that the ultimate threat to national security was not a terrorist attack, but the loss of civil liberties. Moreover, they suggested that the Bush administration could not be trusted to protect either civil liberties or national security. PMOs anchored their framing squarely in the American tradition of constitutionalism and the importance of preserving civil liberties. They insisted that the job of the true patriot was to uphold the Bill of Rights. The American Friends Service Committee enumerated a long list of constitutional rights whose use would form a bulwark against the new dangers facing the country. They concluded, "Working in your communities to use and protect these rights in the weeks ahead will guarantee that terrorism has not destroyed the fabric of liberty or undercut our Constitution" (AFSC, 12/19/01).
In addition to civil liberties, most of the PMOs in our analysis also framed consensus over war and repression as threats to democracy. Almost completely unmentioned in relation to the September 11 event, concerns for democracy became increasingly prevalent in documents addressing instances of legitimated political closure such as consensus over the war in Afghanistan and the passage of the PATRIOT Act. PMOs legitimated their calls for dissent by casting them as examples of democracy in action. To avoid citizen abdication of civic responsibilities by 'blindly accepting' war, the Fellowship of Reconciliation urged "engaged debate and community dialogue in local communities and deep reflection in local communities" (FOR, 12/20/01 and 10/28/01). The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom also called for "deep reflection" on emerging national policies on the part of four sectors of democratic society: ordinary citizens, members of Congress, the media, and the military (WILPF, 10/05/01).
Some groups apparently felt able to speak more freely while flying the flag of democracy, abandoning qualifications and nuance for unvarnished assertions. For example, the War Resisters League (WRL) simply said it was "outrageous" that the U.S. public could find itself at war without knowing the facts. The WRL went on to highlight the balance of powers in American democracy and the imbalanced nature of American democracy currently. Thus the WRL urged the Congress to "retake its rights and responsibilities, to place sharp and immediate limits on the powers of the Executive to conduct the present war" (WRL, 10/12/02).
One could argue that the prevalent use of civil liberties and democracy was not strategic framing responses by the peace movement to 9/11 but rather long-standing, consistent discursive practices. If our hypothesis regarding the effects of legitimated political closure upon movement framing is correct, however, we would expect less use of civil liberties and democracy framing during the Gulf War period, when both the general public and policy makers were far more divided in their opinions regarding war abroad and repression at home (Mueller 1994) . Findings reported in Table 1 support our expectations. PMOs referenced civil liberties and democracy to a far greater extent following 9/11 than they did during the Gulf War period (see Table 1 ). We found forty (raw, not weighted) instances of civil liberties framing in post-9/11 statements, standing in stark contrast to the Gulf War period where no references to civil liberties were coded. PMOs were also twice as likely to discuss democracy-related themes after 9/11 as they were during the Gulf War period. In short, interrelated changes in the cultural climate and political landscape influenced the ways that peace groups talked about war and repression.
Harnessing hegemony enabled U.S. peace movement organizations to craft resonant and potent framing that promoted clear policy alternatives. This strategy helped the peace movement to overcome major obstacles to being heard in times of hyperpatriotism, national mourning, and legitimated political closure. Nonetheless, despite contextual factors that clearly pointed to the advantages of harnessing hegemony, our data also revealed instances of framing that challenged hegemony.
Organizational Identities: Race, Class, Gender, and Nationality
The extent to which a PMO attempts to harness hegemony depends, in part, on its organizational identity. Framing choices are tied to how the organization places itself relative to the general public and potential constituents. What is the nature, mission, and membership of the organization? To whom does it wish to appeal? The centrality of identity formation and expression to understanding collective action is well established (Larana, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994; Melucci 1989 Melucci , 1996 Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett 2002) .
We follow Jasper's useful distinction between three forms of identity: collective, movement, and organizational (1997:86-90) . Collective identity includes perceptions of group uniqueness, boundaries, and interests. It also involves a declared affiliation, membership rules, and a synthesis of shared attitudes and behaviors (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Woehrle and Coy 2000) . Movement identity occurs when people and groups consider themselves and are considered by others to be a force for social change. As with other social movement organizations, PMOs also strive to create a distinctive identity of their own in which the individual self reconstitutes around attachment to the organization (Friedman and McAdam 1992:157) .
All three of these identities affect the ways that activists respond to hegemony. First, activists make collectively strategic decisions about how to employ their organizational identity in political discourse and whether and how to embrace or contest dominant constructions of related collective identities (Bernstein 1997; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994) . Second, PMOs can draw upon and modify dominant constructions in mobilizing support for their claims (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001:137) . For example, women's social movement organizations emphasizing motherhood have succeeded in generating widespread support for their oppositional claims (e.g., Azmon 1997; Navarro 1989). As noted in our discussion of dilemmas in responding to hegemony, however, by embracing hegemonic constructions of collective identities, PMOs risk being doubly marginalized by reinforcing disempowering stereotypes while simultaneously establishing themselves as opponents of the state. By violating shared organizational beliefs and values formed in opposition to the dominant symbolic repertoire on issues such as racial, class, gender, or global equality, harnessing hegemony may invite allegations of co-optation and betrayal. Consequently, PMOs whose organizational identities center on rejecting existing social roles and group power relations are likely to challenge hegemony. Thus when mobilizing those with oppositional identities rooted in consciousness of structural inequalities, resonance considerations generally encourage framing that challenges hegemony (Carroll and Ratner 2001; Mansbridge 2001; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996) . Third, with regard to movement identity, peace movement organizations that intentionally appeal to constituents on the basis of membership in social identity groups face the delicate dance of invoking subgroup cleavages in the effort to expand membership in the larger social movement. These groups seek to challenge the stereotypes related to race, class, and gender yet also recognize that emphasizing the victimization of people of color, poor people, women, and children can serve as a galvanizing frame for antiwar and antiviolence arguments. Moreover, it can be difficult to attract members from historically oppressed groups because affiliation with left-of-center peace groups is often viewed as a way to lose social power rather than as a way to gain it.
Nevertheless the data suggest that these organizations see social identity-based mobilization as one of the means to expand membership and to make the concerns expressed in the organizational discourse meaningful to potential participants.
Organizations with a clear social identity stance such as New York City Labor Against the War, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Women's Action for New Directions, and the Black Radical Congress most often used social identity markers in their framing (see Table 2 ). With the exception of Pax Christi, other organizations studied used social identity markers more rarely, probably because invoking these markers meant potentially sending a message of exclusion to those outside the identity subgroup. Beyond the occasional interplay of race and class issues by the Black Radical Congress and New York City Labor Against the War, we did not observe significant framing strategies that played on the possible intersection of these social identities. Discussing gender was not a means for expanding labor-or race-identified groups, nor did explicitly genderidentified groups show a strong pattern of using race or class frames as represented in Table 2 .
When the events of 9/11 were placed in the context of a systemically racist or class-based system, the oppositional knowledge created in the framing was not just that war was bad for society, but that the impact of war and of terrorism was felt more deeply by poor people and people of color. PMOs noted that military recruits were more likely to be people of color and that those more likely to suffer harm from redirection of funds to the military were the poor who depend on social service programs. The loss of jobs after 9/11 was also raised as a concern in questioning military spending.
Another set of frames pointed to the cycle of violence that large investments in a military response would invoke. This discursive strategy relied on global connections, raising the specter of a humanitarian crisis and linking prejudice and discrimination with violent responses to 9/11 both at home and abroad. Structural violence against the poor and racial minorities was linked to the military industrial complex. This framing strategy suggested that actions create reactions and noted the failure of the United States to respect cultural and religious minori- Notes : Greatest frequency for each code placed in bold. Frequencies represent weighted sums of all paragraphs containing instances of the code. Frequencies weighted to control for differences in the total number of documents collected for the different organizations.
ties and to assist people in lower classes. For example, New York City Labor Against the War wrote,
War will also take a heavy toll on us. For Americans in uniform the overwhelming number of whom are workers and people of color it will be another Vietnam. . . . It will redirect billions to the military and corporate executives, while draining such essential domestic programs as education, health care and the social security trust. In New York City and elsewhere, it will be a pretext for imposing "austerity" on labor and poor people under the guise of "national unity." (NYCLAW, 10/04/01) Some groups challenged the idea of a nation united, arguing instead that in times of war and repression some citizens have less security at home. This framing surfaced in discussions about the targeting of particular groups as suspect and their potential disenfranchisement under a perceived militarized state. For example, there were references to Arabs being viewed as suspect more often than other groups. As Table 2 indicates, the code for "scapegoating," which noted behaviors based on racial or ethnic category within the United States, was more frequent across the groups than codes noting references to race, class, and gender. Seven of the nine groups called attention to the internal use of scapegoating as a product of state responses to terrorism. One possible reason for this disparity is that moral concerns for scapegoated groups can attract potential supporters located across the social spectrum.
Because war has often been framed as defending the "motherland," her women and her children, we found it interesting that discussions of gender were only minimally present in the data set. The two women-centered organizations produced eight documents between September 11, 2001, and mid-November of 2001. Women-identified PMOs generally avoided directly harnessing the stereotypical concept that "women are peaceful" (Christiansen-Ruffman 1995; Ruddick 1998; Slapsak 2001) . Beyond one reference to children, Women's Action for New Directions simply did not invoke gender as a framing strategy. And other than identifying itself as a women's organization, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's references to women and children all appeared in a single document (out of six). When these groups did reference gender, their frames clearly referred to "women" as an identity group by portraying them as antiwar, highlighting their internationalism, noting their compassion for the civilian "other" in war, and viewing women's political space as speaking to the material needs of society. With only one exception, all references to women and children as specific entities were related to concerns that the United States not engage in a violent response to 9/11 by launching a "war on terror."
Instead of focusing on gendered concerns, the women-centered organizations invoked moral opposition to war based on the utilitarian issues of harm to others and war's costs to society. By globally reframing security to include anyone harmed anywhere by U.S. military responses to 9/11, they fundamentally challenged the Bush administration's claims that the war would enhance security. The costs of war were framed generally through references to civilian casualties, though occasionally groups introduced the idea that women and children are particularly harmed. For example, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom stated, "We don't want bombs dropped on a country where 7 million people already face starvation, 60% of them women and children. . . . Women and children are the majority of those killed and wounded in armed conflicts worldwide and 80% of refugees" (WILPF 10/01/2001). The women's organizations also consistently called for a multilateral response to the events of 9/11 and to terrorism in general.
As Ruddick clearly postulates, the latter part of the twentieth century saw an intentional shift away from essentializing rhetoric that connected women to peace (Ruddick 1998) . As "equality" feminism urged women into participation in all social structures, the appeal to the "maternal instinct" became a double-edged sword. Women could be called upon as easily to disprove their passivity as they could to claim an instinctual attachment to peace. The framing responses of WAND and WILPF reaffirm the argument that women-centered organizations have realized that "maternal identity has no essential position; instead it may be used ambiguously to structure very different, even antagonistic, political positions-from promoting peace to advancing war to mobilizing political resistance" (Scheper-Hughes 1998:231). Women's organizations seemed aware that harnessing the positive stereotype of "women as naturally peaceful" is no longer an effective framing strategy. To bring women in, they issued a double challenge to hegemony. Perhaps this helps explain why organizations that are not women centered (Fellowship of Reconciliation and Pax Christi) accounted for two of the three instances where a more traditional gender framing approach was used (i.e., where war is masculine and peace is feminine). Whereas the larger culture may remain somewhat attached to certain patriarchal ideals of motherhood, women-centered organizations that targeted the intersection of feminism and peace appealed more to utilitarian framing emphasizing international unity, security though fairness, and the costs of war and militarism than to images carrying gendered assumptions about behavior.
Overall, we found that the social-structural issues were raised most consistently by organizations whose identities are linked to issues of race, class, or gender (i.e., Black Radical Congress, New York City Labor Against the War, and Women's International League for Peace and Freedom). Nonetheless, although these PMOs were more likely to discursively utilize social identity, social identities were not their primary framing devices. The BRC spoke most often of the need to resist. WAND and WILPF called for alternatives to government responses to the terrorist attacks. Although NYCLAW did spend extensive energy invoking class concerns related to September 11 and the war in Afghanistan, we observe that much of this was in pursuit of developing a relatively new identity of "American labor" as a constituency opposed to war.
Our findings suggest that a goal of the peace movement was to encourage transnational solidarity with the oppressed abroad. Eight of the nine groups raised concerns about the harm of military action on people of other nations, with the focus on nationality being strongest during the war in Afghanistan. When coupled with the frequent use of scapegoat framing, the finding suggests that in situations where the aim is to question the government's foreign policy, PMOs focus their identity framing around social groups they believe will be affected most negatively by the policies, perhaps with the goal of calling on moral persuasion to turn the tide of public opinion.
CONCLUSION
This study makes several important contributions to the field of collective behavior and social movements. Its setting-the events of 9/11-placed peace movement organizations in the position of making strategic choices. PMOs had to decide whether to directly challenge particular hegemonic ideas or to harness them in efforts to foster mass dissent. A series of unprecedented, violent attacks on U.S. soil created discursive and emotional opportunities that encouraged PMOs to harness hegemony. This study shows empirically that with the increasing salience of nationalism, PMOs chose to embrace a nationalist identity, link surging emotions with prognostic attributions, and conform to emotional norms for condemning the attackers and honoring their victims. Comparisons with data from the Gulf War highlight this trend further. Post-9/11 activism for peace became patriotic. Honoring the victims of the 9/11 attacks along with acknowledging feelings of grief, anger, and pride were translated into moral obligations to exercise military restraint. In the face of legitimated political closure, PMOs constructed war and repression as threatening security by transgressing core national values such as civil liberties and democratic participation. By referencing authoritative and widely circulating national principles, PMOs sought to create greater space for political dissent. Splits among policy makers over the war in Iraq and the renewal of the USA PATRIOT Act suggest at least the possibility that the agency-based discursive and emotional work embodied in PMO framing has contributed to political openings.
Although scholars have long noted that activists respond to their environment, few have attempted to theorize, let alone empirically assess, how macrolevel cultural and political processes impact collective action framing. Our ideas that strengthened hegemony and legitimated political closure encourage social movement organizations to harness hegemony constitute theoretical advances that come at time when the field is searching for ways to move beyond the analytical divide between scholars emphasizing meaning, emotions, and agency, on the one hand, and scholars emphasizing structures of mobilization and political opportunity on the other.
While they finessed the cultural constraints by harnessing salient identities, PMOs also challenged hegemony after 9/11. Our research shows that while responding to immediate changes in the cultural and political environment, PMOs' framing and knowledge production was also shaped by their organizational identities. PMOs with oppositional identities rooted in consciousness of structural inequalities emphasized the disproportionate costs of war borne by affiliated minority groups. Referencing of these costs often served as segues to comprehensive challenges of existing power relations both domestically and internationally. Our analysis reveals the ways that oppositional identities rooted in consciousness of structural inequalities encourage social movement organizations to challenge hegemony. This focus in our study responds to long-standing calls for social movement theory to use the interpretive power of race, class, and gender-based analysis and begins to address a major gap in the literature.
Previously, social movement scholars have mostly treated culture as a kind of symbolic resource that, in a relatively straightforward manner, assists organizers in persuading potential supporters to join movements. In contrast, by bringing in the Gramscian concept of hegemony, our research highlights the ways that longterm and broader cultural processes can constrain and shape attempts by social movement organizations to create oppositional knowledge and to mobilize dissent, particularly in times of war. The strengthening of hegemony after 9/11 presented dilemmas for peace movement organizations in the United States. Failure to either positively reference ideas from the dominant symbolic repertoire, to adhere to its emotional norms, or to affirm surging emotions would likely invite incomprehension, ridicule, and repression. Conversely, referencing these ideas and emotions risked further reinforcing hegemony while alienating traditional movement constituencies holding oppositional identities. By revealing the multifaceted and, at times, contradictory responses of PMOs to strengthened hegemony after 9/11, our study contributes to the growing body of work emphasizing ways that dominant cultural processes present obstacles and dilemmas for social movements (Ferree 2003; Williams 2002; Williams and Kubal 1999) .
Our study contributes to the rapidly developing literature on emotions and social movements. This empirical examination demonstrates that PMOs used strong emotions that were commonly expressed by the public to link policy critiques to widely shared and deeply felt national experiences. The PMOs asked how can we both grieve for and honor the victims of 9/11 while also loving and cherishing our traditions of true justice, democracy, and freedom. Our findings show that PMOs used emotions to heighten the potency of their opposition to war and repression. Though our data set is limited in what effects it can measure, we expect that other approaches in future research on this issue will find that effective meaning and emotional work by U.S. peace activists after 9/11 helped the movement to expand beyond its traditional adherents.
Because of its comparative basis for data analysis, our research has brought to social movement analysis a new technique for studying the work of member organizations as they contribute to the development of an oppositional culture. Looking at a diversity of groups and comparing our findings to data from earlier time periods provides unique insight into the processes of framing and its relationship to the cultural hegemony. Mixing rigorous empirical assessment and the application of long-standing social movement theory, this study develops new understanding of how specific social contexts mold responses to collective public events and why dissent is much more complex than habitual disagreement. Dissent often adjusts to political and cultural environments, seeking to open opportunities for oppositional knowledge to resonate in the wider society.
